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Abstract 
 
In 1992 Congress established the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program 
commonly referred to as HOPE VI. Stated goals of the HOPE VI program are to 
demolish, rehabilitate and revitalize some of the most distressed public housing projects 
in the nation. The HOPE VI program is the latest federal attempt to solve some of the 
problems associated with low-income public housing. These problems include, but are 
not limited to, public housing units in disrepair, concentrated poverty, neighborhood 
blight and gang and drug related activity.  
 
This paper provides a history of both federal low-income housing policy and local low- 
income housing policy in Portland, Oregon. The paper then examines the HOPE VI 
program and analyzes whether the criticisms of the federal HOPE VI program apply to 
Portland’s completed HOPE VI project, New Columbia.         
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
In 1992 Congress established the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program-
commonly referred to as HOPE VI. The stated goals of the HOPE VI program were to 
demolish, rehabilitate and revitalize some of the nation’s most distressed public housing 
projects. The HOPE VI program represents the federal government’s new approach to the 
provision of low- income public housing. The program aims to not only physically 
transform public housing buildings, but also to transform the social and economic 
structure of public housing and solve some of the problems associated with the provision 
of low-income public housing. These problems include, but are not limited to, public 
housing units in disrepair, concentrated poverty, neighborhood blight and gang and drug 
related activity.  
 
The history of federal housing policy is relatively short and begins in earnest in 1937 
during the Great Depression. In 1941, the City of Portland became a provider of low-
income, public housing when World War II defense workers streamed into the city. For 
the last seventy years, both the federal government and the City of Portland have wrestled 
with the task of providing low income public housing. Mistakes were made along the 
way and important lessons learned. Understanding the history of both Portland’s and the 
federal governments’ low income public housing policy is key to understanding the 
current debate over HOPE VI.  
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Therefore, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the literature review examines 
federal public housing policy from 1937 to the present. The literature review also 
introduces the HOPE VI program and provides a discussion of the successes and 
criticisms of the program. The case study on the Housing Authority of Portland (HAP) 
follows the time line of the literature review and explores local public housing policy in 
Portland, Oregon leading up to HAP receiving a HOPE VI grant from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development. The analysis chapter applies the criticisms of HOPE 
VI addressed in the literature review to Portland’s HOPE VI project. The analysis 
answers the following question: Do the broadly accepted criticisms of the national HOPE 
VI program apply to Columbia Villa? 
 
The final chapter in the paper is a reflection on what has been learned from looking at the 
history of federal low-income public housing policy and Portland’s history of providing 
low income public housing. This section also discusses the role strong leadership and 
innovation at Portland’s Housing Authority played in the successful implementation of 
HAP’s HOPE VI grant.   
 
Throughout the paper are photos of several HOPE VI sites including Portland’s Columbia 
Villa and New Columbia. Photo credits can be found at the end of the paper following the 
bibliography. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Methodology 
 
Information for this paper was collected through a review of the history of federal and 
Portland specific housing policy. The literature review provides information on historic 
federal public housing policy as well as information relating to current federal housing 
policy and evaluations that are specific to the HOPE VI program. Additional information 
for the paper was gathered from case studies of specific HOPE VI sites, government 
reports and transcripts of testimony to Congress by staff from the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), and local Public Housing Authorities (PHA) from 
HOPE VI sites.  
 
Information specific to the Housing Authority of Portland HOPE VI site, Columbia Villa, 
was gathered from local newspaper articles from the Oregonian and Portland Tribune, 
HAP publications and internal memos, and a forthcoming independent academic 
evaluation. Additional information about the specifics about Portland’s HOPE VI project 
was obtained through an interview with John Keating from HAP and email 
communication with Dr Karen Gibson from Portland State University.  
 
John Keating has been with HAP for over twenty years and has first hand knowledge and 
experience with HOPE VI as it applies to Columbia Villa. Keating is HAPs Assistant 
Director of Community Support Services and was a key figure in both applying for and 
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implementing the HOPE VI grant for Columbia Villa. He is part of the team working on 
Humboldt Gardens, the second HOPE VI project for HAP, which is under way at this 
time. Questions from my interview with Mr. Keating can be found in the appendix 
section.  
 
An email exchange with Associate Professor Dr Karen Gibson from the Nohad A. Toulan 
School of Urban Planning at Portland State University provided confirmation of my 
hypothesis that the four national criticisms of the HOPE VI program described in the 
literature review do not apply to New Columbia. Dr Gibson also provided a copy of her 
forthcoming paper, The Relocation of the Columbia Villa Community: Views from 
Residents, which is scheduled for publication in the Journal of Planning Education. Dr 
Gibson is currently on sabbatical and was unavailable for an interview. However, both 
my email exchange with her and access to her paper on the relocation of Columbia Villa 
Residents provided valuable information for this paper. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides information on the evolution of public housing in the United States 
leading up to the creation and implementation of the HOPE VI program. It also provides 
the reader with an explanation of the HOPE VI program including a discussion of some 
of the nationally recognized successes and criticisms of the program. The purpose of this 
section is to provide the reader with a foundation for understanding the issues 
surrounding the debate over public housing and how that debate applies to this paper’s 
analysis of the HOPE VI funded New Columbia Housing Project in Portland, Oregon. 
 
The HOPE VI affordable housing program is a departure from the status quo; instead of 
focusing on increasing the amount of affordable housing stock, the program’s intent was 
to raise both the physical and social design standards of low income housing. While 
housing quality had become less of a problem for most Americans over the course of the 
twentieth century, the reverse had occurred in public housing. Thousands of public 
housing units in major cities, many built in the 1940s, had within five decades become 
worse than the slums they replaced (Holtzman, 2007). HOPE VI is an ambitious 
approach to building new low income public housing in mixed-income communities. The 
great hope of the program is to create communities of mixed-income development 
located at or near the urban core that provide an assortment of market-rate and below-
market housing for sale or rent, and offer amenities such as parks and play areas, 
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community centers, and recreational facilities. These developments seek to preserve the 
advantages of urban multiculturalism and proximity, retaining the cop-on-the-beat appeal 
of urban neighborhood life and fostering interaction among residents of diverse economic 
backgrounds (Sweazey and Gross, 1997).  
 
Background 
In order to understand the crisis in public housing that led to the creation of the HOPE VI 
program, it is helpful to look at the evolution and provision of low income public housing 
in the United States. What follows is a brief overview of seventy years of federal public 
housing policy and legislation. 
 
 Affordable public housing and federal and local government’s role in providing 
affordable public housing has long been a topic of debate. For over one hundred years 
elected officials have grappled with the problem of how to house the nation’s urban poor. 
Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, philanthropists and moral reformers 
were instrumental in clearing urban slums in industrial cities and passing new tenement 
laws and convincing landlords to build and maintain improved housing (Smith, 2006 and 
Varady, Prieser and Russell, 1998). The passage of tenement laws affirmed the role of 
local government in providing and setting standards for housing for the poor. “In part, 
this sentiment is driven by the fundamental federalist principle that in certain matters, 
local government is the best level at which to determine and implement policy since it 
can be more responsive than the federal government to specific concerns” (Smith, 2006). 
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 The Great Depression of the 1930’s created a favorable climate for federal intervention in 
the housing industry (Varady et al, 1998). Legislation, such as the Wallace-Steagall 
Housing Act of 19371, allowed “government to fund, build, and own homes to rent to its 
poor citizens. This act was pitched as a way not 
only to improve abhorrent living conditions but 
also to stimulate the economy by creating jobs in 
construction and related industries” (Smith, 
2006). Even though the creation of thousands of 
newly constructed housing units in numerous 
cities presented huge economic promise for the 
country, some members of Congress and the 
housing industry were deeply concerned that the federal government was overreaching its 
role and on a slippery slope to socialism (Smith, 2006). 
Figure 1: The Iberville Projects in New Orleans 
were the first low income public housing projects 
built as a result of the Wallace-Steagall Housing Act 
of 1937.  
 
The monumental National Housing Act (NHA) of 1934 is a predecessor to the Wallace-
Steagall Act of 1937 and is considered by scholars to be the “heart of modern housing 
policy” (Smith, 2006, Varady et al, 1998). The NHA created the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA). With the FHA, the federal government could now underwrite and 
insure mortgages and this enabled more families to purchase homes; less money was 
required to be paid upfront by the homebuyer and lenders felt secure in loaning more 
                                                 
1 The Wallace-Steagall Housing Act of 1937 is also commonly referred to as the Wagner Bill.  
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money because the loans were backed by the federal government (Smith, 2006 and Bratt, 
1989). While this legislation also stimulated the economy, it also created the modern 
“two-tiered housing system of housing policy- a means tested program that directly 
produced public housing for poor people to rent and a targeted program that indirectly 
produced private housing for middle income families to buy” (Smith, 2006). These two 
policies have for the last seventy years been instrumental in shaping not only the urban 
landscape, creating a nation of home owners but also have determined where poor people 
live (Smith, 2006, Varady et al, 1998 and Goetz, 2003). 
 
World War II caused a hiatus in low-income housing program (Varady et al, 1998). The 
program was restarted in 1949 with the passage of the Housing Act of 1949. “Reflecting 
mainstream reformist thought and the demands of the real estate industry, the 1949 law 
renewed the war against the slum through 
provisions for slum clearance and new 
construction, under the rubric of urban 
redevelopment” (Varady et al, 1998).  
Figure 2: Pueblo del Rio, Los Angeles. Built 
in 1940, this public housing complex featured a 
sandbox and large sliding glass door to the 
social hall. 
The majority of public housing that was 
constructed during the 1930’s and 1940’s was for 
poor, working families (Curley, 2005 and Goetz, 2003). In order to get federal funding 
for public housing, local governments needed to create Public Housing Administrations 
(PHA). These PHAs became the receivers of federal funds to “construct, manage and 
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operate public housing” (Goetz, 2003). This local autonomy created two conditions in the 
location of public housing. Local governments could simply opt not to have a PHA and 
thus not have a subsidized program at all. This option was practiced in many suburban 
areas. “Most suburbs avoided public housing by simply never creating local housing 
authorities (McDonnell, 1997). Secondly, local control determined where public housing 
was located and this contributed to geographical concentrations of the poor (Goetz, 2003 
and Smith, 2006). The 1949 Housing Act created the one-for one replacement rule by 
mandating that one unit of new housing to be built for every one unit of dilapidated 
housing eliminated through slum clearance. Hirsch (1996) states that this coupling of 
public housing and slum clearance ensured that new housing would be built in areas 
already characterized by high poverty and minority concentrations- leading to the 
creation of a federally sponsored second ghetto.  The result was that for the nearly 
700,000 public housing units built before the civil rights laws of the 1960’s, there was no 
consideration of antidiscrimination as a principle of policy or desegregation as an 
objective when these original public housing projects were built (Goetz, 2003).  
 
While there was a one-for-one replacement requirement as part of the 1949 Housing Act, 
the supply of affordable housing continued to fall short of demand in most major cities 
(Smith, 2006). “Whether due to political will, racial discrimination or just sheer refusal to 
build public housing, new construction never kept up with demolition” (Smith, 2006). 
The Housing Act of 1954 sought to address the above problem by focusing on urban 
renewal that sought to conserve and rehabilitate “urban slums and blight” instead of 
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engaging in slum clearance. It is argued by Smith (2006) that “urban renewal offered 
cities a means to preserve poor neighborhoods without forcing the occupants out.” In 
other words, not only could urban renewal potentially improve poor housing conditions, 
it also had the potential to keep poor people from moving into other neighborhoods and 
thus reinforcing concentrations of minority and poor populations in neighborhoods that 
continued to decline.  
 
An additional legacy of the 1949 Housing Act was the construction of new high-rise 
public housing units. High-rise units were considered to be modern and were inspired by 
Swiss-born modernist 
architect Le Corbusier’s 
airy visions of towers rising 
out of vast expanses of 
grass and greenery (Varady 
et al, 1998 and McIlwain, 
2006). While local housing 
officials saw the high-rise as modern structures that would transform the urban landscape, 
they also erroneously believed that these buildings would be cheaper to construct and 
would house more families on less land than the traditional low-rise public housing units 
that were built during the 1930’s and 1940’s. This would leave more vacant land around 
the high-rise units for open space and parks for residents. However, in the end this new 
design of public housing “created not only islands for the poor, but visible beacons of 
Figure 3: Robert Taylor Homes, Chicago, IL (1963).  
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poverty in many cities at a time when cities were losing their middle class. As a result, 
public housing did not appear to produce the positive results proclaimed by urban 
renewal policy” (Smith, 2006).  
 
In the 1960’s, architects of low-income housing projects began to reject the high-rise and 
in 1968 a presidential commission condemned high-rise public housing units. While there 
were still some high-rise public housing units being built, the majority of public housing 
constructed in the late 1960’s and 1970’s mixed row houses with towers or courts of low-
rise buildings. These new designs (or you could argue a return to the past) were better 
able to incorporate public housing into the surrounding neighborhood, making it 
indistinguishable from housing for the middle-class and connected low-income residents 
to the surrounding community instead of isolating them in high-rises (Varady et al, 1998, 
Goetz, 2003 and Smith, 2006).  
 
Also beginning in the 1960’s was a policy shift in public housing. Government officials 
and housing advocates looked to new programs that provided direct and indirect subsidies 
to private developers of new and rehabilitated low-income housing (Varady et al, 1998). 
Federal policies such as the Section 221 (d) (3) program of 1961 and the Section 236 
program of 1968 allowed lenders to negotiate loans for low-income housing mortgages 
that had below current market interest rates (Varady et al, 1998). Unfortunately, while 
these policies enabled the creation of thousands of new low-income housing units to be 
built quickly, the nonprofits that were largely the ones building these units suffered from 
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limited knowledge and experience on how to construct and maintain low-income housing. 
As a result, some projects fell into default or disrepair. These failures were publicized in 
the local media and made not only the nonprofit look bad but also the federal government 
who had created the policies (Smith, 2006).  
 
In 1973, President Richard Nixon, citing soaring costs and as a cost cutting strategy, 
placed a moratorium on all federal funding for housing programs (Varady et al 1998 and 
Bratt, 1986). Findings from the Experimental Housing Allowance Program and a 
subsequent evaluation indicated that future low-income housing assistance should be 
made in the form of subsidized rental certificates to be used to rent existing private rental 
housing (Bratt, 1986). What followed was the passage of the 1974 Housing and 
Community Development Act. Section 8 of the 1974 act, “created a complicated set of 
subsidies and tax incentives for constructing, rehabilitating and maintaining building with 
low-income rental units” (Varady et al, 1998 and Bratt 1989) and represented a new way 
of delivering subsidized housing that relied on individual tenants and the market to 
achieve dispersal (Goetz, 2003 and Bratt, 1989)2. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The Section 8 rent subsidy serves as a guarantee to both qualified low-income tenants and landlords that 
the federal government will subsidize rent owed. Section 8 voucher approved housing is required to meet 
certain quality standards and has a reasonable monthly rent. Section 8 vouchers can be used when a family 
moves as long as they still qualify for public assistance. According to Hays (1985) and Listokin (1991), in 
the 1980’s, the Reagan administration promoted Section 8 rental vouchers for tenants as a housing program 
that would avoid spending public monies on construction of low-income housing.   
 
 12
HOPE VI 
The latest chapter in the long saga of the provision of low-income housing in the United 
States began in 1989 when Congress formed the National Commission on Severely 
Distressed Public Housing (the Commission). The Commission was charged with 
“proposing a national action plan to eradicate severely distressed public housing by the 
year 2000 (GAO, 2003). In 1992, the Commission released a report that among other 
things identified that 6 percent (approximately 86,000 units) of the nation’s current public 
housing stock was severely distressed.3 The Commission’s report recognized that there 
was a critical need for a “paradigm shift in public housing” (Curley, 2005).  “Although 
the Commission report did not identify any specific areas 
as severely distressed, it recommended that funds be 
made available to address distressed conditions and that 
these funds be added to the amounts traditionally 
appropriated for modernizing public housing” (GAO, 
mission did not identify 
severely distressed,” it wa
 in need of federal h
barracks style projects located adjacent to freeways, industrial developments or simply 
“away” from other residential neighborhoods (Naparstek, Freis, Kingsley, Dooley an
1998). 
which sites they considere
understood that the sites m
Again, while the Com
d “ s 
ost elp were 
the geographically and socially isolated large high rise and 
d 
                                                
Figure 4: The epitome of severely 
reek 
Estates was a 1997 HOPE VI grant 
ward, 
ly 
vacant and uninhabitable. 
distressed public housing, 
Washington DC's, Wheeler C
recipient. At the time of the a
the housing project was large
 
3 Severely distressed public housing units were characterized as physically deteriorated and uninhabitable, 
had inadequate an fragmented services, institutional abandonment, high levels of poverty, and located in 
neighborhoods as blighted as themselves (GAO, 2003, Curley, 2005, Smith, 2006).  
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Lewis, 2000). The Commission recommended to Congress that they “fund a 10-year 
effort at $750 million a year” (Popkin, Katz, Cunningham, Brown, Gustafson and Turner, 
2004). The Commission also “recommended increased funding for support ser
residents of severely distressed public housing, resident participation in revitalization 
efforts and revitalization consistent with any occurring in surrounding neighborhoods
(GAO, 2003).  
vices to 
” 
                                                
 
In response to the Commission’s report, Congress in 1992 established the Urban 
Revitalization Demonstration Program- commonly referred to as HOPE VI4. HUD was 
appointed the programs administrator.  The legislative goals of the HOPE VI program 
were to: 
? Improve the living environment for public housing residents of severely distressed 
public housing through the demolition, rehabilitation, reconfiguration and 
replacement of obsolete public housing; 
? Revitalize sites on which such public housing is located and contributing to the 
improvement of the surrounding neighborhood; 
? Provide housing that will avoid or decrease the concentration of very low-income 
families; 
? Build sustainable communities. 
(HOPE VI: Building Communities Transforming Lives, 1999) 
 
 
HOPE VI is a competitive grant program under which PHAs apply to HUD for funding 
to redevelop or demolish public housing sites. Between 1992 and 2002, HUD allocated 
over $5 billion to 196 HOPE VI sites around the nation (Curley, 2005). Program 
guidelines required that eighty percent of allocated HOPE VI funds be spent by the local 
 
4 HOPE is an acronym for Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere. Initially enacted in 
1990, it consisted of three homeownership programs (HOPE I-III), a program that  combined housing 
vouchers with support services to help frail elders live independently (HOPE IV), and a job training 
program for youth called Youthbuild (HOPE V) (Curley, 2005)  
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PHA on capital costs for physical improvements, certificates for replacement housing 
(generally section 8 vouchers), management improvements for the reconstructed 
development and planning and technical assistance. The remaining twenty percent was 
allocated for community service programs, supportive services, job training, economic 
development costs and services related to education and employment (Varady et al, 1998).  
 
The HOPE VI program is the “paradigm shift” that was recommended by the 
Commission in 1992. The goal of the program was to not only physically transform 
public housing buildings, but also to transform the social and economic structure of 
public housing by creating mixed-income communities where low-income public housing 
residents would live among higher income families who pay market-rate rents. By doing 
this, HOPE VI differs from previous policies by attempting to revitalize the public 
housing community itself, rather than strictly dispersing residents into different 
communities (Curley, 2005; Smith, 2006; Varady, 1998; GAO, 2003; and Holtzman, 
2007).  
Success for HOPE VI 
“I believe HOPE VI has had great success all over the country and that we need to 
replicate the successes in new public housing sites. All HOPE VI projects have 
succeeded in creating a new and improved physical infrastructure for public housing, 
but some projects have been more successful than others at creating a new social 
infrastructure. A renewed and refreshed HOPE VI should try to replicate the successes 
we’ve seen, where there was enormous community investment in the project.” Carole 
Galante, President of Bridge Housing Corp, one of the nation’s largest developers of 
affordable housing, (Kreisler, 2005) 
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The HOPE VI program has received praise from the public, private and nonprofit sectors. 
The program recognizes the negative effects that earlier housing policies had on 
concentrating extremely poor residents in disadvantaged public housing developments 
and neighborhoods and has created a new approach to public housing. As Renee Glover, 
executive director of the Atlanta Housing Authority said before Congress in 2005, 
“without exaggeration, the HOPE VI demonstration program is the most important urban 
revitalization effort that America has undertaken” (McIlwain, 2006). What began as a 
redevelopment and community building program has evolved into a more ambitious 
effort to build economically integrated communities and give existing residents more 
choice in the private housing market (Naparstek et al, 2000). Additionally, HOPE VI 
considered more than simply housing needs by providing funds for social services that 
were designed to help residents move towards self-sufficiency. These programs included 
but are not limited to job training, child care, education and case management (Curley, 
2005 and HOPE VI: Building Communities, Transforming Lives, 1999).  
 
 “The legacy of the HOPE VI program is extremely impressive, representing a true 
paradigm shift that extends well beyond the public housing arena” (Smirniotopoulos, 
2001). Across the nation, in large cities that had experienced decade’s long population 
loss to the suburbs, HOPE VI projects have created demand for residential and mixed-use 
developments in the urban inner core. Prior to HOPE VI funding in these areas, private 
developers, investors and lenders viewed these areas as too risky for investment 
(Smirniotopoulos, 2001 and HOPE VI: Building Communities Transforming Lives, 
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1999). For example, the Columbus, Ohio PHA used its HOPE VI grant to attract crucial 
city infrastructure investments to the surrounding area. As a result, a paint manufacturer 
with a plant located near the HOPE VI site chose to spend $32 million to upgrade its 
existing facility instead of moving to the suburbs (HOPE VI: Building Communities 
Transforming Lives, 1999).  
 
Additionally, an interim assessment of thirteen HOPE VI sites by ABT Associates found 
that key indicators of well-being improved faster in HOPE VI census sites that in their 
cities as a whole (Holin, Buron, Locke and Cortes, 2003). The same study found that 
seventy percent of surrounding residents said that the neighborhood was a better place to 
live after HOPE VI (Holin et al, 2003). A Housing Research Foundation study found that 
eight deteriorating public housing projects contributed significantly to the decline of the 
surrounding neighborhood and HOPE VI by its very nature helped reduce their blighting 
impacts (Zielenbach, 2002). “In Chicago, residents who relocated for HOPE VI 
redevelopment experienced improvements in mental health, which could have positive 
effects on employment and self-sufficiency in the long run” (Popkin and Cunningham, 
2002). Residents using vouchers report that they now live in better housing in safer 
neighborhoods (Buron, Popkin, Levy, Harris and Khadduri, 2002). Sixty three percent of 
families surveyed report that their new housing is in good or excellent condition and 
eighty five percent report that their new housing is in the same or better condition as their 
original public housing unit (Popkin, 2002). Also, most residents report that their 
neighborhoods are less poor. 
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The program has sparked important innovations in design, management and financing 
(Popkin et al, 2004) and has also accomplished its most basic goal-the demolition of tens 
of thousands of severely distressed housing units that were replaced with new, high-
quality housing.  
 
Finally, the HOPE VI program has garnered 
praise for its insistence on participatory 
community planning as the foundation for 
program development. HUD guidance states  
that “residents should be included in all 
phases of HOPE VI development and encourages grantees to communicate, consult and 
collaborate with affected residents and the broader community through resident councils, 
consultative groups, newsletters and resident surveys” (GAO, 2003). Resident 
participation is particularly important during efforts to transform public housing 
properties into mixed-income communities, because it gives residents a stake in their new 
communities (Suchman, 1996). While HUD and local PHAs recognize the importance in 
providing public housing residents with the opportunity to be stakeholders in the process, 
there has been variety in the level of resident participation at HOPE VI sites. This will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Figure 5: Washington DC's Wheeler Creek HOPE 
VI Housing Development today.  
 
 
 
 18
Criticism of HOPE VI 
 
The HOPE VI program is not without its critics. In June, 2002 a report titled False 
HOPE: a Critical Assessment of the HOPE VI Public Housing Redevelopment Program 
(False HOPE) prepared by the National Housing Law Project, the Poverty and Race 
Research Action Council, Sherwood Research Associates and Everywhere and Now 
Public Housing Residents Organizing Nationally Together, the following criticisms of the 
HOPE VI program were presented: 
? HOPE VI worsens acute affordable housing needs 
? There are few meaningful opportunities for resident participation in HOPE VI 
? There is a lack of data on HOPE VI outcomes 
? The majority of public housing families are excluded from HOPE VI opportunities 
(National Housing Law Project et al, 2002) 
 
The criticisms presented in False Hope are reflected in other evaluations and research 
papers of the program to date. What follows is an overview of the findings that have led 
to criticisms of the program. 
 
HOPE VI worsens acute affordable housing needs 
Public Housing is an extremely valuable resource because it is housing that is 
guaranteed to be affordable to families at a wide range of incomes. This includes 
families with the lowest incomes, who are not directly under other federal housing 
programs. Public housing is guaranteed in nearly all situations, rents are set at a level 
equal to thirty percent of an eligible family’s household income (National Housing 
Law Project et al, 2002). 
 
Overall, there is a deficit of affordable housing in the United States. More than a million 
families remain on waiting lists for public housing units, and many PHAs have closed 
their lists to new applicants. By HUD's own estimate, 5.3 million Americans have 
 19
unassisted worst case housing needs and “for every one person that receives assistance, 
there are four or five more who qualify but we don't have the resources to meet those 
needs” (Pitcoff, 1999).  According to HUD, in 1999, there were 70 units of affordable 
housing available for every 100 very low income5 renter households. For extremely low 
income6 renter households, the situation was even worse; there were only 40 units of 
affordable and available housing (National Housing Law Project et al, 2002).  
 
Prior to 1996, federal law prohibited public housing authorities from demolishing any 
public housing units unless they could be replaced (Wright, 2006). In 1996 Congress 
suspended the one-for-one replacement rule. Considered to be the largest impediment to 
implementing HOPE VI, without the one-for-one replacement rule, PHAs were only 
required to “demonstrate to HUD that the units were obsolete and not cost-effective in 
order to demolish them” (Wright, 2006).  The following is an example of how the 
elimination of the one-for-one rule is negatively impacting the supply of affordable 
housing in Chicago, Illinois. The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) is in year seven of 
its ten year redevelopment plan that is funded in part by HOPE VI. The CHA plan calls 
for the demolition of its entire stock of 22,000 high rise public housing units. The CHA 
plans to replace the demolished units, however as of September, 2005 “demolition has far 
outpaced new construction and rehabilitation. CHA has demolished 18,997 units” (Wilen 
and Nayak, 2006). In contrast, as of September 2005, CHA has constructed or 
                                                 
5 According to federal definitions, very low income refers to households with incomes at or below fifty 
percent of the median income of households in their geographic area- “area median income” (National 
Housing Law Project et al, 2002) 
 
6 Households at or below thirty percent of AMI (False HOPE, 2002). 
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rehabilitated only 1,937 units in mixed-income communities of the 6,219 units scheduled. 
Additionally, by 2009 only fifty one percent of the total units of newly constructed 
mixed-income units are scheduled for completion (Wilen and Nayak, 2006). The problem 
is not isolated to Chicago. As of 2005, 57,772 public housing units have been demolished, 
while only 23,109 units have been rehabilitated or newly constructed nationwide (Curley, 
2005). In total, of the 95, 100 replacement units to be built using HOPE VI funds, only 
48,800 will be public housing units (Cunningham, 2004).  
 
In short, the HOPE VI program has directly resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of 
units of guaranteed affordable housing that is desperately needed by families suffering 
from a severe shortage of affordable housing (National Housing Law Project et al, 2002).  
 
There are few meaningful opportunities for resident participation in HOPE VI 
 
Full resident involvement and community input are crucial elements of the HOPE VI 
program. The spirit of the HOPE VI program is one of full consultation and 
collaboration among the Grantee, affected residents and the broader community 
(Naparstek et al, 2000) 
 
HUD’s refusal to issue formal regulations has frustrated public participation in the 
HOPE VI program. A lack of regulations has meant that there has been a lack of clear 
rules for the program. This lack of rules has impeded public understanding of the way 
in which the program operates and has shielded HUD and PHAs from accountability 
for their activities under HOPE VI (National Housing Law Project et al, 2002) 
 
According to a November 2003 GAO report titled HOPE VI Residents Issues and 
Changes in Neighborhoods Surrounding Grant Sites, “the amount and type of resident 
participation has varied at 1996 sites” (GAO, 2003). The report further states that HUD 
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“has provided guidance on resident involvement in its NOFAs7 and grant agreements and 
on its Web site” (GAO, 2003)and that 1996 grantees have taken steps, both informally 
and formally, to ensure that residents are participants in the process. This includes 
soliciting input, holding informational meetings and involving residents in major 
decisions (GAO, 2003). However, although “grantees are required to solicit and consider 
input from residents, the guidance makes it clear that the grantees have the final decision-
making authority” (GAO, 2003). 
 
Critics of HOPE VI argue that because there is a lack of formal HOPE VI regulations on 
resident participation, individual sites have had considerable latitude in defining it 
(Popkin et al, 2004). The problem is further complicated by divisions within the 
residents; resident leadership may sign off on a plan that other residents may not support 
(Popkin et al, 2004). Researchers and evaluators who have looked at the issue of resident 
participation at HOPE VI sites have concluded that in order for resident involvement to 
be more effective, HUD must set clear, consistent guidelines, include a broad range of 
residents and give actual substance to its endorsement of resident and community 
participation in HOPE VI (National Housing Law Project et al, 2002; Popkin et al, 2004; 
GAO, 2003; and Goetz, 2003).  
 
 
                                                 
7 To select housing authorities for participation in the HOPE VI program, HUD publishes a notice of 
funding availability (NOFA) setting forth the program’s current requirements and available funds. Housing 
authorities then prepare applications from which HUD selects those that best satisfy the notice’s 
requirements and sign grant agreements that, in the absence of regulations, serve as contracts with the 
housing authorities (GAO, 1998).  
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There is a lack of data on HOPE VI outcomes 
 
“HUD publishes quite a bit of information concerning HOPE VI expenditures, but 
very little to no public information about original residents’ and service providers’ 
perceptions of HOPE VI services. Additionally, no agency has yet published 
information on a national scale that describes the paths of relocated residents or their 
views on the relocation process” (Moschetti, 2003-2007)  
 
Evaluation of HOPE VI has been difficult due to several factors. The primary reason is 
that HUD has not carried out a single, comprehensive evaluation that would- or could 
examine all aspects of the program (Popkin et al, 2004). This is largely due to the reality 
that, since 1992, the program has experienced changes in legislation, regulation, 
implementation and practice. Furthermore, not all HOPE VI sites are alike- local PHAs 
have tremendous latitude in how they choose to design and implement their local HOPE 
VI initiatives. Also, the program has been shaped more through implementation than by 
enactment. Results from the few evaluations that have been done indicate mixed results 
about the effectiveness of the program.  
 
In 1999, Congress commissioned two systematic, multi-city studies, the HOPE VI Panel 
Study8 (panel study) and the HOPE VI Resident Tracking Survey9 (resident tracking 
survey), to determine how the HOPE VI program has affected the lives of original HOPE 
                                                 
8 The panel study focuses on tracking the living conditions and well-being of residents. The five sites 
included in the study were purposively selected to represent a range of HOPE VI programs. The sites are 
Shore Park/Shore Terrace (Atlantic City, NJ); Ida B. Wells Homes/ Wells Extension/ Madden Park Homes 
(Chicago, IL); Few Gardens (Durham, NC); Easter Hill (Richmond, CA); and East Capitol Dwellings 
(Washington, D.C.) (Popkin et al, 2002).   
9 The resident tracking study also focuses on the living conditions and well-being of former residents of 
eight properties in early 2001-between two and seven years after the housing authority received a HOPE VI 
grant. The eight sites are Quigg Newton (Denver, CO); Archbishop Walsh (Newark, NJ); John  Hays 
Homes (Springfield, IL); Hayes Valley (San Francisco, CA); Cotter and Lang Homes (Louisville, KY); 
Connie Chambers (Tucson, AZ); Christopher Columbus Homes (Paterson, NJ); and Edwin Coming 
(Albany, NY) (Buron et al,  2002).  
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VI residents (Popkin, 2006). The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has provided 
Congress with three reports- Public Housing: Status of the HOPE VI Demonstration 
Program (1997), HOPE VI: Progress and Problems in Revitalizing Distressed Public 
Housing (1998) and Public Housing: HOPE VI Resident Issues and Changes in 
Neighborhoods Surrounding Grant Sites. Finally, HUD has published three major 
reports10- An Historical and Baseline Assessment of HOPE VI11, HOPE VI: Community 
Building Makes a Difference12, and HOPE VI and Section 8: Spatial Patterns in 
Relocation13. 
 
The reports listed do provide valuable information about HOPE VI projects. However, 
none of the reports are sufficiently comprehensive and either provide detailed case 
studies of a few projects (panel study, resident tracking study, Community Building and 
Baseline Assessment) or provide a general overview of certain aspects of the program 
(GAO reports) (National Housing Law Project et al, 2002). The Community Building and 
Baseline Assessment studies also tended to focus more on the physical redevelopment of 
the sites and less on collecting data on original residents and their outcomes (Curley, 
2005). Between these two types of studies there has been a great deal of overlap of 
reporting on a small number of the total HOPE VI sites and is likely that “these reports 
do not provide a representative picture of the program” (National Housing Law Project et 
al, 2002). More studies are needed that explore the actual impact of HOPE VI on the lives 
                                                 
10 Of the three HUD commissioned reports, only one HOPE VI: Community Building Makes a Difference 
has been made widely available on HUD’s website (National Housing Law Project et al, 2002). 
11 This report was prepared for HUD by Fosburg, Popkin and Locke, 1996 
12 This report was prepared for HUD by Naparstek et al, 2000 
13 This report was prepared for HUD by Kingsley, Johnson and Pettit, 2001  
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of original residents or the low-income residents that currently reside in HOPE VI 
communities to determine whether the potential positive effects of the program are 
threatened by potentially negative effects (Curley, 2005).  
 
In addition to the lack of comprehensive evaluations on the program, HUD continues to 
share little information about the program. While HUD does collect a great deal of 
information on each HOPE VI site, it has withheld a great deal of this data from the 
public. Furthermore, While HUD is required to provide annual reports that contain a 
range of financial and funding data on the program on the HOPE VI program to Congress, 
there is no indication that these reports have ever been written (National Housing Law 
Project et al, 2002). If they do exist, these annual reports, which would contain valuable 
financial information about the program and would be useful in program evaluation, are 
not on HUD’s website (National Housing Law Project et al, 2002). 
 
In 1998 the GAO concluded that “it may not be possible to establish HOPE VI- wide 
measures that would be applicable to all programs. We {GAO} agree that the HOPE VI 
sites are unique and that the program should not be constrained in ways that would inhibit 
creativity. Yet even though the needs or the communities and the residents may vary by 
site, the types of community and support service programs offered at the sites we visited 
(e.g. day care, after-school care, equivalency degree, job training and job placement 
programs) were consistent enough to allow the collection of national data on the 
outcomes of these programs” (GAO, 1998).  
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The majority of public housing families are excluded from HOPE VI opportunities 
 
The findings from the first phase of research raise critical questions about whether the 
transformation of public housing will achieve its potential as a powerful force for 
improving the lives of low-income families. As developments are destroyed, the 
residents are displaced and face an uncertain future. Only a small proportion of 
original residents have been able to move to the new mixed-income housing on the 
HOPE VI site, while a substantial proportion- about half- have moved to other public 
housing developments (Popkin, 2006).  
 
While the first purpose set forth under the HOPE VI statute is to “improve the living 
environment for public housing residents of severely distressed public housing 
project,” HOPE VI is doing little to improve the lives of the majority of public housing 
families it affects (National Housing Law Project et al, 2002) 
 
Low original resident return rates is perhaps one of the most widespread criticisms of the 
HOPE VI program- the very people that the program was created to help are excluded 
from returning to live at rehabilitated HOPE VI sites. HUD itself found that only “2,568 
(11.4 percent) of the total 22,500 displaced public housing residents were slated for re-
occupancy in HOPE VI sites after redevelopment (GAO, 1998). While HUD recognizes 
that residents do not always return to HOPE VI sites, HUD’s stated reason for this is that 
residents simply “choose” not to return (National Housing Law Project et al, 2002).  
However, HUD has yet to recognize that low rates of original resident return is largely 
due to a significant decrease of affordable housing available at revitalized sites and 
stricter move-back criteria such as employment requirements and background or credit 
checks that make original residents ineligible (National Housing Law Project et al, 2002, 
Popkin, 2006, Popkin et al, 2004, Goetz, 2003 and Curley, 2005). In addition, new tenant 
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selection procedures allow housing authorities to give preference to working and higher 
income residents (Curley, 2005). 14
 
In order to fully understand low resident return rates, it is important to look at where 
HOPE VI site original residents go when their community is selected for demolition or 
rehabilitation. As completely new communities are built at HOPE VI grant sites, original 
residents have to be relocated. Typical relocation services include assistance in finding a 
new public housing unit or a section 8 unit and moving services. A small number of 
original residents choose to leave public housing with no assistance from their local PHA 
(Curley, 2005). The majority of relocated families- forty nine percent- move to other 
public housing sites (HOPE VI: Building Communities, Transforming Lives, 1999). As a 
result, poverty at the original HOPE VI site is deconcentrated only to be reconcentrated 
to other public housing sites that will not be beneficiaries of HOPE VI funding (Curley, 
2005).  
 
A smaller percentage of dislocated residents are offered section 8 vouchers to obtain 
housing in the private market. In tight rental markets, residents have a hard time finding 
landlords in good neighborhoods that will accept section 8 vouchers (Popkin et al, 2004).  
Additionally, there has been opposition by communities fearful that public housing 
                                                 
14 According to the GAO (2003), “HUD guidance states that grantees must collaborate with residents and 
other stakeholders to establish criteria that residents must meet in order to return to the site. At some sites 
residents are not guaranteed that they will automatically return to the site.” Many dislocated residents were 
unaware when they moved out that they were not guaranteed right of return and if they did apply to return 
to the revitalized site would be subject to strict criteria that applied only to the revitalized site and not to all 
of the local PHAs public housing.  
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residents will bring into their neighborhoods crime and social problems (Lenz and Coles, 
1999). Finally, discrimination against minorities and families with children and the 
negative stigma attached to being a former public housing resident also affects relocatees’ 
ability to secure a unit with a voucher (Popkin and Cunningham, 1999). Studies on 
resident relocation experiences have found that residents make relocation decisions based 
on “significant misinformation about section 8 procedures, HOPE VI move-back criteria 
and availability of relocation services” (Smith, 2002). Other studies indicate that 
relocation services are inadequate for especially hard to house families such as those with 
many children, are multigenerational, and/or have problems with domestic violence, 
substance abuse, disabilities and experience chronic health problems (Popkin et al, 2002). 
These residents may face increased housing instability and even homelessness as a result 
of not being able to find suitable housing in the private market using a voucher.  
 
While the evidence suggests that relocation can be a positive or negative experience for 
families, it is clear that local PHAs must provide residents with relocation services that 
are more comprehensive and include effective case management and follow-up services 
for former residents, especially those with multiple risk factors (Popkin, 2002).  
 
According to the panel study, the majority of relocated residents (seventy percent) 
indicated that they would like to return to their rebuilt HOPE VI site (Popkin, 2006). 
However, GAO data on 165 HOPE VI grantees suggest that rates of return will vary by 
site and will likely remain below fifty percent (Popkin et al, 2004). Developments that 
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remained one hundred percent public housing have higher return rates while new mixed-
income sites have smaller return rates. The GAO reports that forty HOPE VI sites expect 
return rates of 25 percent while thirty one sites expect 75 percent or more to return (GAO, 
2003). These findings could indicate that some residents who would like to return are not 
able to. The reasons for this disparity between the desire to return and the inability to do 
so could be related to (1) a reduction in the number of public housing units at the 
revitalized site or (2) the inability of original residents to meet the PHAs new move-back 
screening criteria. Furthermore, evidence to date suggests that while some residents who 
relocate using vouchers may have improved outcomes, the majority of displaced residents 
either move to other public housing projects thus reconcentrating poverty or struggle in 
the private housing market. “Families who end up relocating to other public housing 
developments or to other extremely poor, distressed and racially segregated communities 
with or without vouchers are the families likely to fare the worst” (Curley, 2005). 
However, for families who had enough guidance and information to make informed 
decisions when they relocated and were able to relocate to better housing and better 
neighborhoods, not being able to return to is not necessarily a bad outcome (Curley, 
2005). The lesson to be learned is that residents, especially those considered hard-to 
house, need extra attention and guidance before and during relocation and every resident 
relocated should be given the opportunity to return to their original HOPE VI site. 
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Conclusion 
Today HOPE VI faces an uncertain future. For the past several years, President George 
W Bush’s Administration has drastically or completely cut funding to the $574 million 
program. This year the presidents’ budget once again called for the elimination of 
funding, arguing that the program has completed its objective of demolishing 100,000 
severely distressed housing units and is no longer needed 
(http://national.unitedway.org/files/pdf/07budgetsummary.pdf, accessed April 26, 2007).  
In an effort to once again restore funding to the program, on March 8, 2007 Senator 
Barbara Mikulski introduced Senate Bill S. 829: To reauthorize the HOPE VI program 
for revitalization of severely distressed public housing and for other purposes 
(http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s110-829, accessed April 26, 2007). 
The bill has not yet been voted on. However, since 2002 Congress has annually voted to 
continue funding the HOPE VI program. 
 
Regardless of whether the program continues to be funded or not, HOPE VI is not the 
final chapter in public housing policy. There will always be a need for safe, decent and 
affordable housing for the most extremely low income citizens of this nation and a need 
for programs to fund and stimulate the creation of this housing. It is by examining the 
history of housing policy in the United States that we are able to learn what policies and 
programs have been effective or not effective in building and maintaining public housing 
stock. The next section provides an overview of the history of the Housing Authority of 
Portland and low income housing policy in Portland, Oregon.  
 30
Chapter 4 
 
Case Study: 
Low-Income Housing in Portland, Oregon:  
A History of the Housing Authority of Portland 
 
In October 2002, HOPE VI funding provided the Housing Authority of Portland (HAP) 
with the opportunity to rehabilitate Columbia Villa (the new development is called New 
Columbia), its largest and oldest public housing development. To understand how the 
Housing Authority of Portland (HAP) designed and implemented its HOPE VI project for 
Columbia Villa, it is important to understand how the agency has been shaped by its 
nearly seventy year history of providing affordable, low-income housing in Portland.  
 
When HUD awarded a HOPE VI grant to HAP for Columbia Villa it was a 462 unit, 
World War II era public housing project located on 82 acres in North Portland. The 
“villa” (as it was commonly called) was the state’s largest public housing development 
and was home to 382 ethnically and racially diverse families. “The villa was the most 
diverse community in the state of Oregon, with fourteen different languages spoken” 
(Gibson, forthcoming). Compared to Portland and the rest of Oregon, Columbia Villa’s 
population was diverse; thirty seven percent of residents were non-Hispanic white, about 
thirty three percent were black, sixteen percent were Hispanic, twelve percent were Asian 
and one percent was American Indian, Pacific Islander, Alaskan (Gibson, forthcoming). 
In contrast, the City of Portland, in 2003, was four fifths non-Hispanic white 
(http://www.pdx.edu/media/p/r/prc_2003_Pop_Report.pdf, accessed April 20, 2007). 
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Figures 6 and 7: Columbia Villa, 1942.
Originally built in 1942 to house World War II workers and their families flooding into 
Portland from across the nation, Columbia Villa’s original 400 permanent housing units15 
(62 units were added to the original site later) were largely single family or duplex, one- 
and two-story units designed to appeal to blue 
collar families.  There was plenty of open space, 
“curvilinear” streets and an abundance of trees 
and greenery (Sanders, 1991). Prominent public 
housing advocate Catherine Bauer visited the 
villa in 1944 and noted that the development was 
“one of the very best in the country” (Oregonian, 
1944).  
 
Columbia Villa was just one of dozens of public 
housing projects HAP was building in the early 
1940’s to accommodate the thousands of new arrivals looking for work in the shipyards. 
By 1944, HAP had built enough temporary and permanent public housing units to house 
over 72,000 people or one sixth of the population of metropolitan Portland (Sanders, 
1991). The sheer magnitude of providing housing to so many in such a short time period 
presented immediate and long-lasting problems for HAP. In the rush to build housing, 
two significant themes emerged that would be left to future generations to confront: 
shoddy housing construction and the ghettoization of North Portland. “Neither problem 
                                                 
15 Of the 72,000 housing units built by HAP in the early 1940’s, only Columbia Villa and Dekum Homes 
were intended to be permanent housing for the poor after the war (Gibson, forthcoming). 
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was caused by HAP, but both would plague the agency in years to come” (Sanders, 
1991)16.  
 
At the end of the war, HAP began the process of dismantling its temporary housing 
projects and relocating residents. Relocation of residents into permanent housing would 
plague HAP throughout the 1950’s. It is during this decade that HAP participated in the 
national trend of urban renewal and slum clearance. In 1952, HAP confined development 
of future permanent low-rent housing to North and inner Northeast Portland. Unlike 
Columbia Villa, which had been and still was largely populated by white families, 
temporary public housing had been largely populated by black families. The result was 
that as the temporary housing units were torn down, the displaced families (who were 
mostly black) moved to new public housing units that were located primarily in inner 
North and Northeast Portland17. During this time, Columbia Villa, with a long waiting 
list and low vacancy rate, stayed primarily white (Sanders, 1991).  
 
Tension between HAP and the African American community came to a head in 1961 
when HAP proposed a new housing development in the inner North Portland Albina 
neighborhood. The African American community strongly opposed the plan arguing that 
it would “perpetuate an already existing ghetto and encourage segregation” (Sanders, 
1991). For the rest of the 60’s, HAP would experience growing anger and opposition 
                                                 
16 It must be noted that most public housing was concentrated in North Portland because of the availability 
of land that was in close proximity to the shipyards themselves (Sanders, 1991).  
17In 1950 more than fifty percent of Portland’s African-American population lived in two census tracts (22 
and 23) in the Albina neighborhood (http://www.pdc.us/pdf/about/urban_renewal_history.pdf, accessed 
May 8, 2007). 
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from the African American community over its housing policies. Several government 
studies to examine HAPs housing policies were done. The results of these studies cleared 
HAP of charges of racial discrimination in housing policy. However, the Board and staff 
from HAP chose to confront racial problems in public housing and emerged from this 
period a stronger public agency that was more sensitive to civil rights issues (Sanders, 
1991). In one housing project, Iris Court18, HAP appointed a special committee to 
develop among other things a movie about living together. “This was the beginning of a 
concentrated effort by HAP’s Board and management to solve the racial problems which 
had troubled it since the end of World War II” (Sanders, 1991). The active role HAP took 
in addressing racial problems in its housing developments provided the foundation to deal 
with future crime and drug problems that would erupt in the 80’s in Columbia Villa. 
 
To better understand the difficulties faced by HAP in the 1970s and 1980s, it is helpful to 
take another look at federal housing policies during this same time that drastically cut 
funding to local housing authorities. As mentioned previously, in 1973, President Richard 
Nixon, citing soaring costs and as a cost cutting strategy, placed a moratorium on all 
federal funding for housing programs (Varady et al 1998 and Bratt, 1986). Another 
legacy of Nixon’s federal housing policy was the change in regulations “that required 
PHAs to adopt federal preferences in admission requirements so that they were serving 
only the poorest tenants” (Popkin, Buron, Levy and Cunningham, 2000). Other federal 
housing policies, such as the Brooke Amendments of 1969 and 1970, further 
                                                 
18 Iris Court during the 60’s had 54 residents; forty were white and fourteen were African American 
(Sanders, 1991). 
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concentrated very poor and distressed households in public housing by limiting tenant 
payments for rents to twenty five percent of income. This made public housing affordable 
to very low income families but also “increased housing authorities’ dependence on the 
federal government for operating subsidies” (Popkin et al, 2000), while at the same time 
eliminating ceiling rents. “Without a ceiling, some of the higher-income families eligible 
for public housing had to pay above market rates to live in public housing, thus making it 
less attractive to them” (Popkin et al, 2000). The result was that by 1991, almost one-fifth 
of public housing tenants had incomes that were less than ten percent of the local median 
(Popkin et al, 2000). 
 
The loss of higher rent paying families and decreases in federal monetary aid was 
devastating to HAP and especially Columbia Villa. Once the shining beacon of the right 
way to do public housing, by the mid 1970s, 
the “villa” had acquired a stigma in the public 
eye. An article in the Oregonian newspaper 
characterized it as having an outdated, 
“institutional” look (Hobart, 1976).  
 
By the late 1970’s, HAP was in serious 
financial trouble. A review of the agency’s 
budget for the years 1973-1977 showed that 
“tenant services had been cut by sixty three Figures 8 and 9: Columbia Villa circa late 1970's 
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percent, protective services by fifty one percent, and non-routine maintenance by sixty 
one percent” (Sanders, 1991). One third of the 1978 operating budget had been cut 
“without a foreseeable remedy for two years” (Sanders, 1991).  As a result, HAPs 
reserves had “shrunk to almost five percent, far below the thirty percent HUD then 
considered the platform below which a housing authority was a financially troubled 
agency” (Sanders, 1991). While HAP was having trouble maintaining its aging public 
housing stock, white flight out of the core of the city created an even less diverse ethnic 
makeup in north and northeast Portland while at the same time diversifying the racial 
makeup of Columbia Villa as more African Americans and other minorities moved in as 
whites moved out.  
 
The 1980’s proved to be a pivotal decade for HAP. New leadership at the housing 
authority recognized that federal support for housing would likely not be coming back 
and that there was a need to find ways to meet client needs “whenever possible by means 
outside of HUD constraints” (Sanders, 1991). This decision led to a five year plan that 
was internally focused and provided a set of policy statements that the HAP Board and 
staff used as goals for planning. These goals were: 
? To increase visibility of HAP services; 
? To expand HAP’s contacts and increase HAP’s cooperative efforts; 
? To maintain a commitment to low income housing and increase development efforts 
to expand HAP’s role in meeting the needs of other people whose needs were 
currently unmet by other private and public groups 
? To interact with the social service community more aggressively to assist residents in 
getting their needs met; 
? To continue improving current operations 
(Sanders, 1991) 
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HAPs five year strategic planning paid off and by 1982 the agency was declared 
financially stable and in 1986 was given “decontrol status”19 (Sanders, 1991). By 1988 
HAPs internal financial structure had been rehabilitated and the agency then moved to 
reconfirm its commitment to its external customers who, according to Executive Director 
Don Clark, were all interrelated.  
“Our strength is in our relationships, Clark stated. The more we are able to include 
residents, other agencies and community groups as partners, the stronger we become. 
We need to develop dynamic new ways of relating with residents and other key 
customers of our services-ways of including, not excluding them. And we have to make 
them recognize this new relationship and participate in it” (Sanders, 1991) 
 
Clark’s commitment to community building would be tested soon after he made this 
statement when Joseph ‘Ray Ray’ Winston, Portland’s first drive by shooting victim, was 
killed at Columbia Villa (Gibson, forthcoming). By 1988, the epidemic of gangs, 
violence and crack cocaine had invaded inner North and Northeast Portland and by that 
summer, Columbia Villa had become “almost literally a war zone, torn apart by gang 
activity, drug dealing and violence. Columbia Villa was a neighborhood with intense 
problems, but left isolated and alone to cope with them (Sanders, 1991). The response to 
the violence was swift when the city, HAP, community groups and residents came 
together to create a strategy that included community policing, rigorous enforcement of 
leasing and trespassing policies and comprehensive social services. The strategy was 
successful and by 1994 “HAP received HUD’s best practices award for reducing drug-
related crime by 75 percent” (Gibson, forthcoming). While peace and stability returned to 
                                                 
19 “Decontrol status” is granted by HUD to PHAs that achieve the highest standards of financial stability. 
PHAs with this status have greater freedom in running their financial affairs (Sanders, 1991).  
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the “villa,” it could not so easily shake the perception that it was still a haven of crime, 
illicit activity and drug use.  
 
Though financially stable, by 2001 HAP was struggling to fund the continuous repairs 
that were needed at the “villa;” “repeated maintenance problems with the sixty-year-old 
housing, combined with decades long reduction of 
HUD funding, influenced HAP’s decision to take 
advantage of the opportunity presented through the 
HOPE VI revitalization program” (Gibson, 
forthcoming). According to Howard Shapiro, then 
chairman of the Housing Authority’s Board, 
Columbia Villa had become “an island of dormitory-
style buildings falling into disrepair with almost a 
moat around it” (Robben, 2003). The idea was to tear 
that wall down so that at the end of the day, there 
wouldn’t be McMansions or ghettos but a more 
balanced community that was truly, truly representative of North Portland (Robben, 
2003). 
Figures 10 and 11: Columbia Villa, 
September, 2003. 
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Figure 12: The demolition of Columbia Villa.  
While the last seven decades have been filled with financial and social, internal and 
external challenges, HAP has remained a committed leader among the nations PHAs to 
not only provide quality and safe low-income housing but also to create communities of 
caring neighbors.  Once again HAP would 
be tested when it received a HOPE VI grant. 
Uncertainty for HAP and the residents 
plagued the project. Would HAP repeat the 
same mistakes made by so many other 
housing authorities? Would existing 
residents benefit? Do the same criticisms 
leveled against HOPE VI in general apply to New Columbia?  
 
The next chapter of this paper revisits the four widely accepted criticisms previously 
discussed in the literature review: (1) HOPE VI worsens acute affordable housing needs; 
(2) there are few meaningful opportunities for resident participation in HOPE VI; (3) 
there is a lack of data on HOPE VI outcomes; and (4) the majority of public housing 
families are excluded from HOPE VI opportunities (National Housing Law Project et al, 
2002). Using information gathered from the literature available on Columbia Villa and 
my interview with John Keating and email exchange with Dr Gibson, I analyze whether 
(1) these criticisms apply to Columbia Villa and (2) answer the question of why or why 
not.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Analysis: Bringing HOPE to Portland 
“The HAP board and staff were keenly aware of the well-documented issues and 
problems other PHAs had experienced” (HAP, 2004) with HOPE VI. According to John 
Keating, HAPs Assistant Director of Community Services, “we were well aware of the 
criticisms of earlier HOPE VI projects and used those criticisms as a road map of how to 
do it right” (Keating interview, May 16, 2007). As a result, criticisms of the HOPE VI 
program discussed in chapter two simply do not apply to New Columbia (Gibson, email 
correspondence). This chapter tells the story of how HAP created an implementation plan 
for the New Columbia project that (1) included residents in all planning stages of the 
project, (2) compiled data on and evaluated resident outcomes, (3) increased the 
overall number of low income units and (4) did not exclude public housing families 
from returning.  
 
This is done by testing whether the four widely accepted and well-documented criticisms 
of the HOPE VI program apply to Columbia Villa. My analysis is based on information 
obtained through research on the history of federal public housing policy and Portland’s 
Housing Authority,  a review of current evaluations and government documents relating 
to the HOPE VI program and HOPE VI sites including Columbia Villa, email 
communication with Dr Gibson, an in-person interview with John Keating. I also was 
given access to HAP’s annual report to the Housing Authority Board. This document 
included memos from HAP’s Executive Director, Steve Rudman. Among these memos 
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are notices of awards received by HAP for New Columbia including one given by the 
Oregon Association of Minority Entrepreneurs (OAME) for its commitment to assure 
“contracting and workforce diversity on construction projects”(HAP, 2007). Additional 
information was gathered from reading newspaper articles appearing in both the 
Oregonian and Portland Tribune.  
 
 
Criticism of HOPE VI: There are few meaningful opportunities for resident 
participation in HOPE VI 
 
Response: The HAP Board and Executive Team made a commitment that 
if HAP was awarded a grant, they would work in partnership with 
residents to make the relocation process as smooth as possible 
 
Resident relocation is one of the biggest challenges 
facing most HOPE VI sites and one where resident 
participation can be most helpful. HAP faced the 
challenge of relocating all of Columbia Villas 
residents because all 462 units were slated for 
demolition20. Every household would have to be 
relocated to Section 8 housing or other public housing 
projects21 and HUD required that HAP prepare a Resident Relocation Plan. As 
participants in the formulating this plan, HAP wanted its residents to become well-
Figure 13: The Columbia Villa HOPE VI 
Resident Relocation Team. 
                                                 
20 The original plan for demolition and rebuilding was scheduled to be staggered and some residents would 
have to be relocated to section 8 or other public housing. However as the project progressed it became clear 
that HAPs phased resident relocation plan was in conflict with the developer’s plans. As a result, HAP had 
to relocate all families from the villa in three months. 
21 Residents also had the choice to leave public housing and look for housing in the private market without 
assistance. 
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informed stakeholders in the HOPE VI relocation process. In order to learn more about 
the process and experiences of other residents that had experienced relocation, HAP 
funded several resident tours of the Seattle Housing Authority’s New Holly HOPE VI 
site. HAP also paid for officers of the Columbia Villa resident association to attend a 
national conference to learn more about HOPE VI. In addition, HAP staff sought input 
from all residents by “walking the streets” soliciting resident input and spent several 
Saturdays surveying households (HAP, 2004). HAP’s efforts paid off; before the project 
began, ninety percent of the “villas” households had been visited by HAP personnel and 
those households had the opportunity to ask questions and provide HAP staff with 
valuable input (HAP, 2004). HAP also established an eighteen member Community 
Advisory Committee (CAC) to “serve as the primary conduit for community input into 
the HOPE VI plan” (HAP, 2004). CAC decided to appoint a fifteen member Relocation 
Task Force (RTF) because of the scope and importance of relocation to the overall HOPE 
VI project. Several CAC members served on the RTF committee thus ensuring that CAC 
was “in the loop” on issues surrounding resident relocation. Both the CAC and the RTF 
were composed of a wide variety of stakeholders that included HAP employees, residents 
of Columbia Villa, social service providers, public school representatives, tenant 
advocates and neighbors from the surrounding community (Keating, May 16, 2007).  
 
HAP also created the position of resident/community liaison and hired a Columbia Villa 
resident to fill it (HAP, 2004). According to Leslie Esinga, the resident/community 
liaison, “distrust of the government, distrust of the track record tallied up by other HOPE 
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VI sites and distrust of the Housing Authority- those were my hurdles. Essential to 
executing a plan of action was to instill the residents’ trust in our words” (HAP, 2004). 
Today Esinga is working as one of two HAP community builders at New Columbia. 
Essentially, the community builders are there to “connect the dots between residents, 
HAP and multiple social service agencies and play an important role in both resident and 
public relations” (Keating, May 16, 2007).  
 
HAP was able to gain the trust of residents by including them in all phases of planning, 
implementing a relocation plan supported by residents, soliciting input from all residents 
and hiring a resident from Columbia Villa to serve as resident/community liaison. 
Resident participation did not end with completion of the project. According to John 
Keating, the long term success of New Columbia 
hinges on HAP’s ability to create an environment 
that encourages active and ongoing resident 
participation. Since May of 2005, HAP has been 
holding “town hall” style meetings to help build 
community between returning residents and those 
new to the site (Gibson, forthcoming).  Without involved residents who have a sense of 
ownership of their neighborhood, problems that do arise will be much more difficult to 
solve (Keating, May 16, 2007).  
Figure 14: New Columbia resident meeting 
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Criticism of HOPE VI: There is a lack of data on HOPE VI outcomes 
 
Response: HAP committed its evaluation resources to answering the hard 
questions from a customer perspective. These evaluations will be made up 
of both data and individual stories that will tell the HOPE VI story 
through the experiences of residents. 
 
HAP as a later recipient of HOPE VI funds took advantage of the opportunity to learn 
from PHAs of earlier HOPE VI award sites. One of the criticisms most often leveled is 
that there is a lack of evaluation and data on HOPE VI outcomes. HAP anticipated that 
the community would have questions at the end of the HOPE VI project that would relate 
to resident experience at all phases of the project. In order to answer those questions, 
HAP hired Dr. Karen Gibson from Portland State University’s Center for Urban Studies, 
to monitor and assess the following components the project: relocation, housing stability, 
community supportive services (CSS) and re-occupancy (HAP, 2004 and Gibson, 
forthcoming). The goal of the evaluation is to answer “12 hard questions that may be of 
concern to the local community” (Gibson and Detweiller, 2004). The 12 hard questions 
that HAP was interested in answering were: 
1. Will residents really get to come back at the completion of redevelopment? If not, 
why? 
2. Are residents who wish to return to New Columbia able to maintain stable 
housing throughout the redevelopment process? 
3. Is housing less stable for residents who use Section 8 vouchers? If so, why? 
4.  What assistance was provided to support families with Section 8 vouchers? 
5. Did residents feel they had a sufficient number of locations to choose from during 
the relocation process? 
6. Were Relocation and CSS staffs helpful? Knowledgeable? 
7. How long did it take residents to feel connected to their new communities? 
8. If residents wished to relocate within North Portland, were they able to? If not, 
why not and how have residents adapted to their new neighborhood? 
9. What part of town did residents move to and how satisfied are they with their new 
location? 
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10. How long did it take for residents’ children to adjust to their new schools? 
11. What do residents miss most about Columbia Villa? 
12. What effect did participating/not participating in the GOALS Program have? 
(HAP, 2004) 
 
In order to determine answers to those questions, Gibson interviewed HAP staff, 
residents and project affiliates and conducted three resident mail surveys; one in the fall 
of 2003 and two in the spring and fall of 2004 (Gibson and Detweiller, 2004). In a 
forthcoming paper, Dr Gibson provides analysis on outcomes of resident relocation from 
Columbia Villa and gives answers to the above questions. One aspect of the project that 
is a subject of further evaluation is determining why fewer residents returned to New 
Columbia than were expected. This aspect of the project will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  
 
The evaluation done by Dr Gibson has provided HAP and the local community with 
answers to some of those 12 hard questions. HAP realized that with a project of this size 
and scope, there was the potential for mistakes to be made. In order to learn from those 
mistakes or determine how some aspect of the project may have been done better, HAP 
early on brought in an outside evaluator. While results of the evaluation show that 
relocation was a positive experience for the majority of households, what is also shown is 
that there were the problems that arose when those in extreme poverty are separated from 
support networks (Gibson, forthcoming). “This evaluation,” says Keating, “and more 
evaluations like this one help HAP and the residents that are our customers. Overall, we 
{HAP} did a good job, but your best lessons most often come from where you fell short. 
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We have another HOPE VI project underway now and we are applying lessons learned 
from New Columbia to that project” (Keating, May 16, 2007). 
 
Criticism of HOPE VI: HOPE VI worsens acute affordable housing needs 
Response: New Columbia increased the overall amount of affordable 
housing stock. 
 
When HAP was awarded the HOPE VI grant, 382 of Columbia Villa’s 462 housing units 
were occupied. As noted, the entire 
development was demolished to make way for 
854 brand new public, affordable and market 
rate housing units. Of the 232 housing units for 
sale, 39 are designated “affordable” and have 
income restrictions. Of the units for rent, 297 are 
designated public housing, 73 are Section 8, 66 are available to senior citizens and 184 
are available to households earning less than 60% of the Area Median Income 
(http://www.hapdx.org/newcolumbia/rentals.html, accessed May 20, 2007). In addition, 
HAP built 92 public housing units off-site to “help lessen concentrations of public 
housing and make sure that there is no net loss of public housing in the city” 
(http://www.hapdx.org/newcolumbia/pdfs/NCfactsheet.pdf, accessed May 20, 2007).  
Figure 15: Higher density housing at New 
Columbia 
 
Policies at various levels of city and regional government supported (or it could be said 
demanded) that New Columbia increase the number of affordable housing units. When 
 46
HAP received the HOPE VI grant from HUD, the City of Portland had recently revised 
its subdivision code. This new code required a greater density of housing units per acre 
than was previously required22. The increased density of housing units at New Columbia 
also supports Metro’s Regional Housing Goals by increasing the supply of affordable 
housing in the region and offering a diverse range of housing types within the region and 
cities in the Urban Growth Boundary (Regional Housing Choice Implementation Strategy, 
2006).  
 
Criticism of HOPE VI: The majority of public housing families are 
excluded from HOPE VI opportunities 
 
Response: Every family that was relocated during construction was 
guaranteed the right to return to live at New Columbia23. 
 
In May, 2005, residents began returning home. Columbia Villa was renamed New 
Columbia. As of December, 2006, all residents who wanted to return had done so. Initial 
surveys indicated that forty seven percent of residents planned on returning to New 
Columbia, thirty eight percent were undecided and sixteen percent indicated they would 
not be returning (Gibson, forthcoming). In the end only 109 families (or about thirty 
percent) returned to New Columbia. This number was lower than HAP expected, but still 
was fifty percent higher than the national average of twenty percent (Gibson, forthcoming 
and Keating, May 16, 2007). 
                                                 
22 According to Keating, while the city would have liked to see a total of 1200 units built at New Columbia, 
this was not an economically feasible option. The original site plan was for 852 replacement houses. This is 
close to the minimum density required by the city for 82 acres of land.  
23 This right of return was guaranteed to residents unless they had been convicted during the relocation 
period of a crime that is considered a violation of the public housing lease and ground for eviction from 
public housing and returning residents had to agree to follow community rules that applied to all housing 
types, including those for sale (http://www.hapdx.org/newcolumbia/pdfs/relocation.pdf, last accessed May 
20, 2007).   
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Results from a new survey conducted by Dr Gibson are being studied to determine why 
residents chose not to return. Initial indications are that the majority of those that chose 
not to return were “either satisfied with their new location, did not want to move again, or 
both” (Gibson, forthcoming). Four percent of households were evicted from public 
housing during the relocation process or shortly after moving back to New Columbia for 
lease violations. In addition, several families have moved back to New Columbia as 
homeowners; either by purchasing one of the affordable housing units or participating in 
Habitat for Humanity’s homeownership program.  
 
While the rate of return was lower than expected for New Columbia, what is important is 
that the choice not to return was overwhelmingly a choice. Original residents, unless 
convicted of a crime, all were guaranteed a housing unit at New Columbia. High rates of 
satisfaction with their new location and/or not wanting to move again were the main 
reasons behind the decision not to return. This indicates that HAP staff did a good job in 
finding residents housing they could feel comfortable in during the relocation process and 
did not make residents feel that they were not welcome to come back at the end of 
construction.  
 
It is also worth noting in this section that during relocation, HAP implemented a CSS 
program that was “designed to help people improve the quality of their lives and to 
increase their skills to lead to greater self-sufficiency” (HAP, 2004). HAP recognized 
early on that the CSS program would not be successful unless households had a sense of 
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housing stability during relocation. Many families were unaware of the higher cost 
associated with living in Section 8 housing versus the cost of public housing. In order to 
ensure families succeeded during relocation, HAP hired a Housing Stability Specialist 
who would administer the $20,000 reserve fund to cover resident emergencies such as 
unanticipated high utility costs. HAP also hired a School Stability Specialist to help 
families make a “smooth transition into their children’s new school” (HAP, 2004). Both 
of these positions and the reserve fund was paid for out of HOPE VI grant funds.   
 
 
Conclusion 
This analysis, using a variety of sources, indicates that HAP took the criticisms of the 
HOPE VI program and used them as a “roadmap” to design and implement their own 
program. By doing this, HAP understood the criticisms of HOPE VI early on and was 
able to mitigate those criticisms so that they simply did not apply to New Columbia. 
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Chapter 6: 
 
Conclusion 
 
In April, 2006 when I first began thinking of a topic for my exit project, I researched 
several topics relating to low income housing policy. One of the first topics that held my 
attention was the HOPE VI program. In researching HOPE VI, I discovered that Portland, 
Oregon had a recently completed HOPE VI project, New Columbia. In researching both 
HOPE VI and New Columbia what immediately struck me was that the well-known and 
accepted national criticisms of the HOPE VI program simply did not apply to New 
Columbia. That led me to wonder why? Answering that question has been the foundation 
of this paper. 
 
In order to understand HOPE VI, I looked at the seventy year history of federal public 
housing policy that led to the creation of the HOPE VI program. Understanding the 
history of federal public housing policy provided the foundation I needed to understand 
why HOPE VI was considered a “paradigm shift” federal public housing policy.  
 
Once I began looking at Portland’s experience with HOPE VI, I wondered why 
Portland’s experience with HOPE VI had been so different. I hypothesized that this is 
because of the unique character of Portland’s Housing Authority. In the course of 
working on this paper I researched the history of HAP, and discovered that the agency 
has a long history of responsiveness to both internal and external customers, willingness 
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to confront challenges and strong leadership. That the New Columbia project can be 
viewed as a successful HOPE VI project is due to (1) the diligence and commitment of 
those working for the agency now and (2) the foundation of excellence that has been 
established over the agency’s nearly seventy year history.  
 
Strong Leadership 
Over the years, HAP has had a history of strong executive directors and Board members. 
The strength of leadership helped HAP confront charges of racism in the 1960s, fiscal 
challenges in the 1970’s and violence, gang activity and drug use in the 1980s. Strong 
leadership in the late 1980s and into the 1990s pushed the agency to rebuild its internal 
structure. This enabled it to then look outside itself and coordinate and collaborate with 
other government agencies, nonprofits and for profit businesses.  
 
This history of strong leadership was crucial to successful implementation of HAPs 
HOPE VI grant. “Without a doubt, the success of New Columbia can be attributed to 
the {HAP} staff. These are dedicated people. That dedication is supported from the very 
top- an executive director- that trusts the staff. Also, we have had great leadership 
through the years- that has formed our basic core value to treat people and the 
community well. It is natural for us to do things according to the “core values” 
(Keating, May16, 2007). 
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Innovation 
The City of Portland has long been viewed as an innovator in land use planning and the 
environment. What is less well known is that HAP is also an innovator in the realm of 
public housing. Long before the HOPE VI program called for creating partnerships to 
leverage and raise funds for public housing, HAP was doing just that. In the 1980s, HAPs 
then Executive Director Don Clark recognized that in order to survive ongoing federal 
funding cuts, HAP would need to reach out and establish partnerships with multiple 
groups. Establishing relationships with public housing residents, neighbors, community 
leaders, nonprofits, other city and county agencies, section 8 landlords, housing 
advocates and for profits was vitally important to HAPs success. In 2002 when HAP 
received its HOPE VI grant, the agency had a twenty plus year history of working with 
those very groups that were necessary to implement the HOPE VI grant.  
 
New Columbia Today 
On Thursday, May 10, 2007, the in Portland section of the Oregonian newspaper 
featured New Columbia on the cover with the headline New Troubles at New Columbia 
(Beaven, 2007). The article highlighted recent racial tensions between Hispanic and 
African American youths. This tension stems from incidents that have occurred in 
McCoy Park which is located in the very center of the 82 acre development. The city and 
HAP have responded swiftly to the situation in New Columbia. “Failure is not an option 
here,” says John Canda of Portland Mayor Tom Potter’s Office (Beaven, 2007).  
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HAP Executive Director Steve Rudman also knows that failure is not an option and 
recognizes that HAP “might have been a bit too optimistic, a bit too unrealistic” (Beaven, 
2007) about New Columbia. Portland Police initially wanted police officers in New 
Columbia when the development opened. However, HAP was resistant. According to 
Rudman, “We should have, from the beginning worked with the community policing 
office” (Beaven, 2007). Adds Rudman, HAP “did not plan adequate police presence 
because it didn’t expect violent crime in a neighborhood with both private homes and 
public housing” (Beaven, 2007).  HAP’s Keating also notes that the decision not to have 
a community policing presence in New Columbia from the beginning was a mistake. “We 
truly believed that it would not be necessary, which was a mistake” (Keating, May 16, 
2007).  
 
However, the situation is not all bad for New Columbia. Market rate homes are selling 
briskly bringing a new type of resident into New Columbia. Recently HAP was named 
Public Agency of the Year by the Oregon Association of Minority Entrepreneurs (HAP, 
2007). The award recognizes HAP for its commitment to assure “contracting and 
workforce diversity on construction projects. Certainly it is a reflection of the successes 
at New Columbia, where we exceeded our aspirational goals of both fronts” (HAP, 2007). 
New Columbia also received the top award from the Oregon Department of Housing and 
Community Services in the community revitalization category (HAP, 2007).   
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When I asked John Keating what HAP has learned from the New Columbia project, he 
was quiet for a few minutes. “What I learned is that things you never thought of were the 
problems- like having a park in the center of the development with a basketball court. 
Who knew that would create so many problems. We should have separated renters and 
home owners. It would have made the development easier to manage. We should have 
had stricter move back requirements for original residents. But the most important thing I 
learned is that this development worked and will continue to work because of the people- 
the residents and the staff. There is buy-in here. We all fought hard to make this project a 
success. We will still fight. We, the staff and the residents, wanted, still want, to make 
New Columbia a place to be proud of” (Keating, May 16, 2007). I have no doubt, based 
on the history of HAP, that New Columbia will be a place to be proud of and will 
overcome the problems it is currently facing. It has a long history of doing just that. 
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Appendix 
 
May 16, 2007 
 
Interview with John Keating, HAP Assistant Director, Community Support Services. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. How many units does New Columbia have? 
 
 
2. How many original households returned to New Columbia? 
 
 
3. In the 1950’s, New Columbia was predominantly white. What happened between 
1950 and 1990’s that changed the makeup? 
 
4. How/Why did HAP decide to almost double the number of housing units?  
 
5. HAP actively involved residents in the relocation phase. Were residents involved 
in the design phase of the project?  
 
6. How does HAP involve the residents now? 
 
7. Is there still a resident/ Community Liaison?  
 
8. What did HAP learn from the process?  
 
9. Do you think that HAP already was set up to succeed with New Columbia 
because of earlier leadership decisions that recognized the need to find ways to 
meet client’s needs “whenever possible by means outside of HUD constraints?” 
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